Gail C. Van Tassell v. Elwood C. Shaffer : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1986
Gail C. Van Tassell v. Elwood C. Shaffer : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Thomas A. Duffin; Spafford, Dibb, Duffin & Jensen; attorneys for respondent.
William F. Bannon; Strong & Hanni; attorneys for appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation





K F U 
50 
DOCKET NO. i;N THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GAIL C. VAN TASSELL, and 









BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from the Judgment of the 
Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County 
Honorable J. Leonard Russon, Presiding 
WILLIAM F. BANNON 
STRONG & HANNI 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 
THOMAS A. DUFFIN 
SPAFFORD, DIBB, DUFFIN & JENSEN 
311 South State, Suite 311 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent 
AUG 2 21985 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GAIL C. VAN TASSELL, and ; 
AFTON VAN TASSELL, ] 
Plaintiff and ] 
Respondent, ] 
v s . ] 
ELWOOD C. SHAFFER, ] 
Defendant and ) 
Appellant. ) 
) N o . 20334 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from the Judgment of the 
Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County 
Honorable J. Leonard Russon, Presiding 
WILLIAM F. BANNON 
STRONG & HANNI 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 
THOMAS A. DUFFIN 
SPAFFORD, DIBB, DUFFIN & JENSEN 
311 South State, Suite 311 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
LIST OF ALL PARTIES 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 1 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 3 
ARGUMENT 
I. DEFENDANT WAS NOT "ABSENT FROM THE 
STATE," NO BASIS EXISTED FOR TOLLING 
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND PLAINTIFFS' 
ACTION AGAINST THE DEFENDANT SHOULD BE 
BARRED AS NOT TIMELY FILED 4 
II. IF ALL ABSENCES ARE TO BE COUNTED FOR 
PURPOSES OF THE TOLLING STATUTE, THEN 
ONLY FULL DAYS SHOULD BE COUNTED 10 
CONCLUSION 12 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
Beebie v. Shelley, 610 P.2d 713 (Mont. 1980) 9 
Bray v. Bayles, 618 P.2d 807 (Kan. 1980) 8 
Buell v. Duchesne Merchantile Co., 231 P. 123 (1924). . . 6,12 
Byrne v. Ogle, 488 P.2d 716 (Alaska 1971) 8 
Carter v. Kreschmer, 577 P.2d 1211 (Kan.App. 1978). . . . 8 
Gass v. Hunting, 561 P.2d 1071 (Utah 1977) 7 
Leggett v. Stricklind, 640 F.2d 774 (5th Cir. 1981) .. . 9 
Lipe v. Javelin Tire Co., Inc., 536 P.2d 291 
(Idaho 1975) 9 
Pina v. Watson, 564 P.2d 916 (Ariz.App. 1977) 11,12 
Selby v. Karman, 521 P.2d 609 (Ariz. 1974) 8,11 
Snyder v. Clune, 390 P.2d 915, 15 Utah 2d 
254 (1964) 6,7,8,9,10 
Tarter v. Insco, 550 P.2d 905 (Wyo. 1976) 8 
Yergensen v. Ford, 402 P.2d 696, 16 Utah 2d 397 (1965). . 5 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Annotated, §78-12-22, 1953, as amended . . . .2,4,5 
Utah Code Annotated, §78-12-35, 1953, as amended .1,3,5,10,13 
Utah Code Annotated, §68-3-7, 1953, as amended 11 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 4(e)(1) 1,3,7,9 
IN THE SUPREME COUB I"  01 IHE STA T"E 05 I I rAH 
GAIL C. VAN TASSELL, and 




EI iWOOD C. SHAFFER. 
Defendam i i-.: 
Appellant. 
BRIEF Ob APPELLANT 
No. 20334 
t Ion 
LIST OF ALL PART; '<-• 
* oceec i Aps tiei e • 
] I s t e e l i i i t h e c a p -
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPFA^T 
i . A e t h e r ^78-1 ' *' ' * j , i i ^ - -^ota^ed nr '--l'l-s f o r 
t h e t o ! 1 iryo * . . ' ^ „ Lt 
d e f e n d a n t ::-on. • •*.* S t . i r e ol ; ' t m d e s p i t e t r ie H ' a i i a b i L i ' 
i s e r v i c e under Rure - u t a n i \ u i c s o f 
u . v 2 \ X . A t t -
u j s e n ^ t ^ ' "< - - :a t : v ->f 
tie a b s e n c e c o m p u t e d : 
£> i.*-. 1 EME.N - A c i S 
Although the original -inder Lying iiLigat:,.-
was lengthy and rather complex, L.*W. .nscant case ^::volv 
. s case 
action by the plaintiffs to reaffirm a judgment obtained against 
the defendant and appellant on December 3, 1973. 
It is undisputed, and appears on the record, that plain-
tiffs filed their action to reaffirm the judgment on February 5, 
1982 (Plaintiffs' Complaint), more than eight years after entry 
of the original judgment agtainst the defendant. 
Defendant answered, raising as a defense the statute 
of limitations contained in §78-12-22, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
as amended, (Defendant's Answer). 
Plaintiffs then embarked upon protracted and lengthy 
discovery (Notice of Taking Deposition dated May 12, 1982, Notice 
of Taking Deposition dated October 21, 1982, Notice of Taking 
Deposition dated October 26, 1982, Notice of Taking Depositions 
dated January 26, 1983). 
Depositions were designed to determine what days the 
defendant may have been out of the State of Utah on business or 
vacations from the date the original judgment was entered until 
the date that the instant action was filed. 
Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment which was 
heard before the Honorable Judith Billings on May 26, 1983. 
Judge Billings ruled that all times when the defendant was out of 
the State after entry of judgment tolled the statute and was not 
a part of the period of time provided for the commencement of an 
action upon the judgment and denied defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
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plaintiffs1 action should have been barred as not timely filed. 
2. Even if each of defendant's absences should have 
been excluded from the period of the running of the statute of 
limitations by virtue of said statute, only those whole days 
during which the defendant was absent from the State should be 
counted towards the time for tolling the statute of limitations. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
DEFENDANT WAS NOT "ABSENT FROM THE STATE," 
NO BASIS EXISTED FOR TOLLING THE STATUTE 
OF LIMITATIONS AND PLAINTIFFS1 ACTION 
AGAINST THE DEFENDANT SHOULD BE BARRED AS 
NOT TIMELY FILED. 
The most recent judgment obtained by plaintiffs against 
defendant was signed and entered on December 3, 1973. Although 
defendant resided openly within the State of Utah from that date 
until the present date, no attempts were made by plaintiffs or 
plaintiffs1 counsel to serve garnishment, execution or other 
legal process upon him. There were no attempts to serve process 
against the defendant until February 20, 1982, when he was suc-
cessfully served at his home. After defendant raised the statute 
of limitations of §78-12-22, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended, plaintiffs1 counsel embarked upon a course of discover 
stretching out well over a year to determine each and every time 
that the defendant had left the State of Utah for any purpose 
whatsoever. No claim was ever made that the plaintiffs had 
attempted to serve process during any of these absences or that 
-4-
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time limited for the commencement of the 
action. 
Early cases dealing with this statute were inconsistent. 
Cases decided between 1908 and 1924 reached opposite conclusions 
but the most recent statement of this court in Buell v. Duchesne 
Merchantile Co., 231 P. 123 (1924), held that each absence from 
the state tolled the statute of limitations notwithstanding the 
fact that the debtor maintains a resident in the state with per-
sons residing there upon whom service of process might be had. 
That case would appear to be directly opposite of the position 
urged by defendant, here. Defendant seeks to have this case 
overruled to the extent that it has not already been overruled by 
the case of Snyder v. Clune, 390 P.2d 915, 15 Utah 2d 254 (1964). 
In that case, the court specifically found that the statute was 
not tolled against a non-resident motorist by virtue of the 
availability of service of process upon the secretary of state. 
In discussing the tolling statute and the effects of alternative 
service upon it, the court stated: 
It is obvious that the objective of the 
statute above quoted is to prevent a 
defendant from depriving a plaintiff of 
the opportunity of suing him by absenting 
himself from the state during the period 
of limitation. In connection with the 
plaintifffs contention, it is necessary to 
also consider our Non-resident Motorist 
Act, §41-12-8, U.C.A. 1953, which was 
enacted in 1933, (S.L.U. 1943, Chap. 68, 
§12). It authorizes service upon a non-
resident of the state by serving the 
secretary of state. The effect of this is 
to constitute the secretary of state as 
the agent of a non-resident motorist to 
receive process for him. Further per-
tinent to this problem is Rule 4(e)(1) 
U.R.C.P., which states that personal ser-
vice may be made upon a defendant "• . . 
by delivering a copy to an agent 
authorized by appointment or by law to 
receive service of process." [Emphasis 
the Court's] The defendants thus had an 
agent within the state upon whom process 
could have been served for them, and they 
were thus not "absent" from the state in 
the sense contemplated by the statute, 
that is, unavailable for service of pro-
cess. Therefore, the plaintiff was not 
prevented from commencing her action at 
any time she desired. That being so, 
there exists no reason for tolling the 
running of the statute. 
Although the present case does not involve the Non-
resident Motorist Act, Rule 4(e)(1) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
also provides for service upon a defendant "by leaving such copy 
at his usual place of abode with sorne person of s 1 11 t:ab 1 e age and 
discretion there residing;" it was undisputed throughout this 
case that there was always someone at home at defendant's resi-
dence throughout any of the times that he was physicalLy absent 
from the State of Utah. He simply was not absent from the State 
in the sense contemplated by Snyder v. Clune, supra, that is, 
unavailable for the service of process. 
A later case, Gass v. Hunting, 561 P.2d 1071 (Utah 
1977), at first glance, appears to refuse to extend this prin-
ciple beyond the non-resident motorist statute. The facts of 
that case are unclear from the five paragraph decision which sta-
tes simply that a si Ii t oi i a judgraent may be comin.enced di ir11 ig 
eight years after entry thereof and an absence from the State 
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tolls the eight-year period. It is unclear exactly what argu-
ments were made in that case or whether that case may properly be 
used to support any position in this case. 
Snyder v. Clune, supra, has been cited as well-reasoned 
authority for similar decisions outside of the State of Utah. 
See Carter v. Kreschmer, 577 P.2d 1211 (Kan.App. 1978); Tarter v. 
Insco, 550 P.2d 905 (Wyo. 1976); Byrne v. Ogle, 488 P.2d 716 
(Alaska 1971). While all of these cases involve non-resident 
motorist statutes, other courts have found the reasoning behind 
the decision in Snyder v. Clune, supra, equally applicable to 
civil actions as a whole. 
In Selby v. Karman, 521 P.2d 609 (Ariz. 1974), the 
court dealt with an undistinguished tort action and, under a 
nearly identical tolling statute found that an absence, for vaca-
tions and business, of 52 days out of a two-year period of limi-
tations would not be counted under the tolling statute and barred 
plaintiff's action. The court stated: 
[W]e, therefore, hold that the terms 
"without the state11 and "absence" as used 
in A.R.S. §12-501 mean out of the state in 
the sense that service of process in any 
of the methods authorized by rule or 
statute cannot be made upon the defendant 
to secure personal jurisdiction by the 
trial court. 
The Kansas Supreme Court applied this reasoning to a 
medical malpractice claim in Bray v. Bayles, 618 P.2d 807 (Kan. 
1980). In that case one of the defendants was absent from the 
state at different times for a total of 23 days prior to the fil-
-R-
ing o f p 1 a I r 11 i f f ' s a c t: i oi i • Th e c o x1 • f > 1 ph e 1 d t: h e i e c I s I o n < :) f the 
Court of Appeals that absence from i:he state meant beyond the 
reach of process of Kansas courts. The court found: 
Under the circumstances of this case, the 
statute of limitations was not tolled even 
though both defendants were out of the 
state for the brief periods of time indi-
cated above, since it was possible for 
the plaintiffs to obtain service on the 
defendants at all times. This could have 
been accomplished either by serving them 
under the long-arm statute, K.S.A. 
60-308(b)(2), or simply requesting an 
order from the district court allowing 
service to be made by leaving a copy of 
the petition and summons at the residence 
of each defendant as authorized by K.S.A. 
60-304(a). 
The latter method c: f service is available to all pi aintiffs in 
the State of Utah without order of the court. See also Lipe v. 
Javelin Tire Co., Inc. , 536 P.2d 291 (Idaho 1975); Beebie v. 
Shelley, 610 P.2d 713 (Mont, 1980); and Leggett v. Stricklind, 
640 F.2d 774 (5th Cir. 1981). Each of the cases cited here by 
defendant reaches its conclusion with respect to the toll Ing 
statute by the same reasoning employed by this court in Snyder v. 
Clune, supra . .\ :-. clear that plaintiffs made no attempt what-
soever to r- • "• - V - * oii or serve process upon the defendant dur-
ing the eight-year period following entry of their judgment. The 
defendant did not abscond from the State of Utah in order to 
avoid process i Ior • :!i < i I ie conceal himse] f . He was resid11 ig openly 
within the State of Utah and was subject to service of process 
each and every day of the eight-year period by virtue of Rule 
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4(e)(1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure or through the Utah long-
arm statute. Plaintiffs, in this case, simply neglected to file 
their action in a timely manner. The resulting expensive and 
protracted discovery in this case itself emphasizes the need for 
the rule urged by defendant. If plaintiffs are allowed to pre-
vail in this appeal, then all plaintiffs faced with an untimely 
filing will embark upon any discovery necessary to establish that 
the defendant may have taken vacations or business trips outside 
of the State of Utah in order to save their claim. The statute 
of limitations is defeated and the purposes of the tolling 
statute are not served. 
The reasoning of Snyder v. Clune, supra, should be 
extended to all civil actions. The defendant should be con-
sidered absent from the State only when he is unavailable for 
service of process and plaintiffs' complaint should be barred as 
not timely filed. 
II. 
IF ALL ABSENCES ARE TO BE COUNTED FOR 
PURPOSES OF THE TOLLING STATUTE, THEN ONLY 
FULL DAYS SHOULD BE COUNTED. 
The very necessity for this argument points out the need 
for a redefinition of "absence11 as urged by defendant, above. 
The tolling statute, §78-12-35, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended, states, in pertinent part: 
. . . The time of his absence is not part 
of the time limited for the commencement 
of the action. 
The question then arises as to how ; >..- is to be measured. 
Is it weeks, days, hours or even minutes? 
The trial c in the present action, had trouble 
dealing with that issue and relied upon §68-3-7, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as amended, in deciding that the first day of 
the absenci AMI1<1 )M> exe i utloil ,ind thr* I ist I iv wo:; i "?«- • led. 
This was the ruling of the court despite a lack of urging by 
counsel for either plaintiffs or defendant. Plaintiffs1 position 
was that both the first and last days of the absence should be 
counted and defendant's position was that the first and the last 
days should be excluded since, on both the first and last day, 
the defendant would be within the State of Utah and avai Iable for 
service of process for at least part of that day. 
This position is supported by the case of Pina v. 
Watson, 564 P.2d 916 (Ariz.App. 1977). In that case, the court, 
operating under Selby v. Karman, supra, it found that only those 
timet i lefendant was unavailab] e for service of process 
would be counted for the tolling statute. The plaintiff 
attempted to show that during two one-week vacations there was no 
one at home for ser »ri ce of process and alternative ser vi ce was 
unavailable because the defendants whereabouts were unknown. 
The court determined that there were two days on the vacation 
when their whereabouts coiild n. . -»e :ediona::. • : *. - » 
18-hour periods when they were in transit, and on the road. The 
p l i ! r '•" .'. ' » ' * - ; • periods ana the court, 
in answer thereto, stated: 
1 1 
We disagree with the opponents1 interpre-
tation and application of Selby v. Karman, 
supra. It stretches a literal reading of 
the case -- and logic -- too far to say 
that a defendant is absent from the state 
unless he is amenable to process every 
hour of every day. We do not believe our 
Supreme Court intended that "absence" and 
"without the state" be defined in terms of 
that kind of absolute continuous avail-
ability for service of process, or to 
allow a plaintiff to aggregate hours dur-
ing periods of absence would create a vir-
tually undefined limitations period which 
would be unfair to the defendant and pro-
cedurally unmanageable. 
We conclude that in order to toll the 
statute of -limitations, a plaintiff at a 
minimum must be able to show whole days 
when the defendant could not be served 
with process. Where a defendant could 
have been located with reasonable dili-
gence on any part of a day, he is not 
"absent" or "without the state" within the 
meaning of the tolling statute and Selby. 
It is clear that on the first and the last days of the 
periods attempted to be established by the plaintiffs that the 
defendant was either leaving the State or arriving in the State 
during that day and was, therefore, available for service of pro-
cess during part of that day. Under the reasoning of Pina v. 
Watson, supra, those days should not be included in any period 
for tolling the statute of limitations. 
CONCLUSION 
Methods of substitute service under the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure and the long-arm statute have eliminated the need 
for the strict rule of Buell v. Duchesne Merchantile Co., supra. 
The b e 11 e i re as oned ri 11e, and that adop ? P < 1 11 1 i 1 ear1y a ] J ne I g h -
boring jurisdictions, is that "absence" -m i "without the state" 
for purposes of the tolling provisions of §78-12-35, Utah Code 
Annotated, should mean unavailable l.'nt service of pn>ees\ Since 
defendant was available for service of process throughout the 
eight years following entry of judgment for plaintiffs, plain-
tiffs1 action to reinstate or reaffirm the judgment was not 
timely filed and should be barred by the statute of limitations. 
The judgment il: the tria, ;ir ±:\ \ ' i idgment 
of dismissal entered for defendant. 
If the court finds that each day of absence must, 
indeed, be excluded i inder the tolling stati ite, then only those 
full days during which the defendant was absent from the State 
should be counted and the first and last days of anu business or 
pleasure trips should be excluded. 
Respectfully submitted this day of August, 1985. 
STRONG & HANNI 
By _ _ _ _ _ 
William F. Bannon 
Attorneys for Defendant 
-rj 
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THOMAS A. DUFFIN (0927. 
SPAFFORD, DIBB, DUFFIN S ENSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
311 South State, Suite 380 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 531-8020 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GAIL C. VAN TASSELL, ] 
and AFTON VAN TASSELL, ] 
Plaintiffs, [ 
vs. ; 
ELWOOD C. SHAFFER, 
1 J U D G M E N T 
i Civil No. C82-1011 
Defendant , ) 
The above entitled matter came on regularly for hearing 
before the Honorable Leonard H, Russon, one of the judges of the 
. , • 1984 "Thomas 
Duffin appear; , ro; ^ *. jvh «*t i * < plaintiffs, Gail ( 
Tassell *r Afton Tassel. and William .• 3annon appearing 
• **** * r *«.•-, whereupon the 
court heard the respective testimony of Elwoo^ Shaffer and 
being fully advised in the premises, and having entered its 
Findings < . i-mn 1 usioi is c £ I -aw, i low, therefore , on 
motion of Thomas A. Duffin, 
0 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. That Gail C. Van Tassell and Afton Van Tassell 
have and recover from Elwood C. Shaffer the sum of $94,954.98, 
together with interest at the rate of 12Z per annum from date 
hereof, together with plaintiffs costs and disbursements in the 
sum of $ 
Dated this ?>Qr day of October, 1984. 
BY THE COURT: 
'^1 I. (4\JL&l\QJU?( /6u^4*M-7 
JUDGE 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I, Polly Mansfield, Secretary to Thomas A. Duffin, 
Attorney for plaintiffs herein, certify that I mailed a copy of 
the foregoing Judgment to the following parties by placing a true 
copy thereof in an envelope addressed to: 
William F. Bannon 
Attorney for Defendant 
600 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
postage prepaid, this / f day of October, 1984. 
1016(4) J 
THOMAS A. DUFFIN (0927) 
SPAFFORD, DIBB, DUFFIN & JENSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
311 South State, Suite 380 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 531-8020 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GAIL C. VAN TASSELL, ] 
and AFTON VAN TASSELL, 
Plaintiffs, ] 
vs. ; 
ELWOOD C. SHAFFER, 
Defendant. ) 
1 FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
i Civil No. C82-1011 
The above entitled matter came on regularly for hearing 
before the Honorable Leonard H. Russon, one of the judges of the 
above entitled court, on the 12th day of October, 1984, Thomas A. 
Duffin appearing for and on behalf of the plaintiffs, Gail C. Van 
Tassell and Afton Van Tassell, and William F. Bannon appearing 
for and on behalf of defendant, Elwood C. Shaffer; whereupon the 
court heard the respective testimony of Elwood C. Shaffer and 
being fully advised in the premises, now enters the following 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law: 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That on or about the 19th day of November, 1973, 
in the matter of Kamas State Bank, plaintiff, v. Gail C. Van 
Tassell, Charles 0. Shaffer and Elwood C. Shaffer, defendants, 
Civil No. 4386, in the Fourth Judicial District Court in and for 
Summit County, State of Utah, entered judgment by the plaintiff 
against the defendants, Gail C. Van Tassell, Charles 0. Shaffer 
and Elwood C. Shaffer for the sum of $33,162.12. 
2. In the same case of Kamas State Bank, plaintiff, 
v. Gail C. Van Tassell, Charles 0. Shaffer and Elwood C. Shaffer, 
defendants, Civil No. 4386, in the Fourth Judicial District Court 
in and for Summit County, State of Utah, on December 3, 1973, the 
court entered judgment as follows: 
"WHEREFORE BY VIRTUE OF THE LAW AND BY THE REASON 
OF THE PREMISES AFORESAID IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, 
ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS: 
"1. That Gail C. Van Tassell have and recover 
from Elwood C. Shaffer a judgment for any and all 
sums paid by Gail C. Van Tassell to the plaintiff, 
Kamas State Bank, on the deficiency judgment of 
$33,162.12 entered herein by Kamas State Bank 
together with interest at the rate of 8% per annum 
for any and all payments made on the judgment 
until reimbursed by Elwood C. Shaffer. 
"2. That Gail C. Van Tassell do have and recover 
from the defendant, Elwood C. Shaffer, a judgment 
in the sum of $17,889.00 together with interest at 
the rate of 8% per annum from date hereof until 
paid together with Van Tassell's costs and 
disbursements incurred in this action amounting to 
the sum of $105.00." 
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3. That on the 1st day of February, 1974, in the 
matter of Kamas State Bank, plaintiff, v. Gail C. Van Tassell, 
Charles 0. Shaffer and Elwood C. Shaffer, defendants, Civil No. 
4386, in the Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Summit 
County, State of Utah, an Assignment of Judgment was duly 
assigned by Kamas State Bank to Afton Van Tassell, wife of Gail 
C. Van Tassell on the judgment of $33,162.12 entered the 19th day 
of November, 1973. 
4. That the parties stipulated in open court that the 
judgments were valid and subsisting and that the judgment of the 
3rd day of December, 1973, incorporated the deficiency judgment 
of the Kamas State Bank against Gail C. Van Tassell and 
incorporated the judgment by Kamas State Bank against Gail C. Van 
Tassell and Elwood C. Shaffer and then in turn gave Gail C. Van 
Tassell a judgment over and against Elwood C. Shaffer for the 
amount entered by the Fourth Judicial District Court. 
5. That Gail C. Van Tassell and Afton Van Tassell as 
plaintiffs, v. Elwood C. Shaffer, defendant, in the within 
entitled matter, Civil No. C82-1011, commenced an action to renew 
the said judgments on the 5th day of February, 1982. 
6. The court finds that between December 3, 1973, and 
December 3, 1982, that the defendant, Elwood C. Shaffer, had 
absented himself from the State of Utah and was not within the 
state and the court finds that in computing the time for 
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determining how long the defendant was out of state, has excluded 
the first day and included the last day from the time that he 
left the state until the time that he arrived back in the state 
of Utah and the court further finds that Elwood C. Shaffer was 
out of the state of Utah as computed above during the following 
periods of time: 
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TOTAL 96 days 
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7. The court thus finds that the defendant, Elwood 
Shaffer, during the period of time from December 3, 1973, through 
December 3, 1982, was out of Utah for a period of 96 days. 
8. That the amount due and owing on the Judgment 
assigned to Afton Van Tassell is the sum of $33,162.12, together 
with interest at the rate of SX per annum in the sum of 
$28,519.32 or a total of $61,681.44. 
9. That the amount due and owing on the judgment of 
December 3, 1973, to Gail C. Van Tassell, is the sum of 
$17,889.00, together with interest in the sum of $15,384.54, or a 
total of $33,273.54, together with court costs in that action of 
$105.00. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now 
makes the following Conslusions of Law: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That the plaintiffs, Gail C. Van Tassell and Afton 
Van Tassell, are entitled to a judgment against Elwood C. Shaffer 
for the sum of $94,954.98, together with interest at the rate of 
12Z per annum from date hereof, togehter with plaintiff's costs 
and disbursements in the sum of $ 
2. The court finds that pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, §78-12-35 that the 96 days that Elwood C. 
Shaffer absented himself from the state of Utah, is not part of 
the tine limited for the commencement of the action. 
-6-
Dated this day of October, 1984. 
BY THE COURT: 
JUDGE 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I, Polly Mansfiald, Secretary to Thomas A. Duffin, 
Attorney for plaintiffs herein, certify that I mailed a copy of 
the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law to the 
following parties by placing a true copy thereof in an envelope 
addressed to: 
William F.' Bannon 
Attorney for Defendant 
600 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
postage prepaid, this / / day of October, 1984. 
Mr 
THOMAS A. DUFFIN of 
SPAFFORD, DIBB, DUFFIN & JENSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
311 South State, Suite 380 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 531-8020 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GAIL G. VAN TASSELL, 
and AFTON VAN TASSELL, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ELWOOD C. SHAFFER, 
Defendant. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C82-1011 
The above entitled matter came on regularly for hearing 
on the 26th day of May, 1983, before the Honorable Judith M. 
Billings, one of the judges of the above entitled court, Thomas 
A. Duffin appearing for and on behalf of plaintiffs and William 
F. Bannon appearing for and on behalf of defendant, and the court 
having examined the depositions in the above entitled matter and 
it further appearing that the defendant was out of the state for 
substantial periods of time during the period of time after the 
Judgment was rendered. 
The court finds that the days and periods of time when 
the defendant was out of the state after entry of judgment as 
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provided for in the plaintiffs' Complaint tolls the statute and 
is not part of the period of time provided for the commencement 
of an action upon a judgment. Now, therefore, on motion of 
Thomas A. Duffin, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. That the defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
is hereby denied. 
Dated this day of June, 1983. 
BY THE COURT: 
JUDGE 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I, Polly Mansfield, Secretary to Thomas A. Duffin, 
Attorney for plaintiffs herein, certify that I mailed a copy of 
the foregoing Order to the following parties by placing a true 
copy thereof in an envelope addressed to: 
William F. Bannon 
Attorney for Defendant 
600 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
postage prepaid, this day of June, 1983. 
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS 78-12-22 
Neff, 43 U. 258, 134 P. 1160, following 
Jenkins v. Jensen, 24 U. 108, 66 P. 773, 
91 Am. St. Rep. 783. 
Rule that where administrator is barred 
by lapse of time, heirs are also barred, 
had no application where property had 
been distributed in accordance with stat-
ute, and heir seeking to recover such prop-
erty distributed to him while he was minor 
within two years after he attained ma-
jority was not barred from maintaining 
action, since limitation did not start to 
run against plaintiff until he had attained 
majority under this section. Bobbins v. 
Duggins, 61 U. 542, 216 P. 232, distin-
guished in 13 U. (2d) 404, 375 P. 2d 461. 
Fact that seven years had not passed 
since heirs had reached age of majority did 
not preclude running of statute of limita-
tions so as to bar them from intervening 
in quiet title action to claim an interest 
as heirs where property descending to them 
from their father's estate had been dis-
tributed to a guardian who had had posses-
sion or right to possession of that property 
for more than the required seven years. 
Parr v. Zions First Nat. Bank, 13 U. (2d) 
404, 375 P. 2d 461. 
Purchaser at tax sale. 
Where defendant purchased tax deed 
from county, and immediately thereafter 
entered into possession of property, paid 
taxes on property for statutory time, made 
valuable improvements on property, and 
held property openly and notoriously, he 
was entitled to have title to property in 
controversy against all parties except those 
under disability. Baker v. Goodman, 57 
U. 349, 194 P. 117. 
Collateral References. 
Limitation of Actions€=>70 et seq. 
54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions §216 
et seq. 
51 Am. Jur. 2d 747 et seq., Limitation 
of Actions § 178 et seq. 
Imprisonment as tolling statute of limi-
tations, 24 A. L. R. 2d 618. 
Infancy or incompetency of one on 
whom legal title devolved as interrupting 
adverse possession previously initiated, 65 
A. L. R. 975. 
Prescription or adverse possession 
against one under disability of infancy, 
coverture, or mental incompetency, 43 
A. L. R. 941, 147 A. L. R. 236. 
Proof of unadjudged incompetency which 
prevents running of statute of limitations, 
9 A. L. R. 2d 964. 
Statute providing that an insane per-
son, minor, or other person under dis-
ability may bring suit within specified 
time after removal of disability as af-
fecting right to bring action before dis-
ability removed, 109 A. L. R. 954. 
Tacking disabilities for purposes of the 
statute, 53 A. L. R. 1303. 
Time of existence of mental incompe-
tency which will prevent or suspend run-
ning of statute of limitations, 41 A. L. R. 
2d 726. 
ARTICLE 2 
OTHER THAN REAL PROPERTY 
Section 78-12-22. Within eight years. 
78-12-23. Within six years. 
78-12-24. Public officers—Within six years. 
78-12-25. Within four years. 
78-12-25.5. Injury due to defective design or construction of improvement to 
real property—Within seven years. 
78-12-26. Within three years. 
78-12-27. Action against corporate stockholders or directors. 
78-12-28. Within two years. 
78-12-29. Within one year. 
78-12-30. Actions on claims against county, city or town. 
78-12-31. Within six months. 
78-12-32. Action on mutual account—When deemed accrued. 
78-12-33. Actions by state. 
78-12-34. No limitation against recovery of bank deposits or other property. 
78-12-22. Within eight years.—Within eight years : 
An action upon a judgment or decree of any court of the United States, 
or of any state or territory within the United States. 
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78-12-22 JUDICIAL CODE 
Aii action to enforce any liability due or to become due, for failure 
to provide support or maintenance for dependent children. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1 ; C. 1943, 
Supp., 104-12-22; L. 1975, ch. 96, § 26. 
Compiler's Notes. 
Prior to the 1975 amendment, this sec-
tion was identical to former section 104-
2-21 (Code 1943) which was repealed by 
Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3. 
The 1975 amendment added the second 
paragraph, relating to support. 
Separability Clause. 
Section 27 of Laws 1975, ch. 96 provided: 
"If any provision of this act, or the appli-
cation of any provision of this act to any 
person or circumstance is held invalid, the 
remainder of this act shall not be affected 
thereby." 
Cross-References. 
Execution to issue within eight years, 
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 69(a). 
Judgment a lien for eight years, 78-
22-1. 
Uniform Act on Paternity, 78-45a-l et 
seq. 
Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act, 
78-45-1 et seq. 
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Sup-
port Act, 77-61a-l et seq. 
Alimony and child support arrearages. 
The eight-year statute of limitations ap-
plies to past due unpaid installments for 
alimony or support of minor children, and 
therefore execution may issue only for the 
arrearages accumulated within a period 
of eight years. Seeley v. Park, 532 P. 2d 
684. 
Effect of stipulations. 
Parties to contract may stipulate for 
period of limitations shorter than that 
fixed by statute of limitations. Clark v. 
Lund, 55 U. 284, 184 P. 821. 
Fraudulent conveyance. 
This section was not a bar to an action 
to impress judgment lien on property where 
complaint alleged that property had been 
transferred to defraud creditors, and that 
property was held in trust for defendant. 
Moulton v. Morgan, 115 U. 119, 202 P. 
2d 723. 
Installments. 
In case of a judgment payable in install-
ments, statute runs from time fixed for 
payment of each installment for the part 
then payable, and not from date of the 
judgment. Buell v. Duchesne Mercantile 
Co., 64 U. 391, 231 P. 123. 
Where judgment payable in installments 
provided that plaintiff could have execu-
tion for total amount due if default in 
payments should be made, plain intent 
was that execution should issue for only 
such amounts as were due at time of de-
fault so that statute did not begin to 
run from date of default. Buell v. Du-
chesne Mercantile Co., 64 U. 391, 231 P. 
123. 
Judgment on contract. 
Where judgment was rendered in favor 
of creditor in an action founded on con-
tract, the debt did not thereafter retain 
its original character as a contract debt, 
but a new cause of action on the judgment 
was substituted, and the statute of limita-
tion with respect to judgments applied to 
an action to renew the judgment. Yergen-
sen v. Ford, 16 U. (2d) 397, 402 P. 2d 696. 
Limitation period not tolled. 
Action to renew a judgment brought 
more than eight years after the date of 
entry of the original judgment was barred 
by this section even though defendant 
had signed a written agreement acknowl-
edging the obligation and had made some 
payments thereon less than eight years 
before commencement of the action. The 
common-law rule which tolled the limita-
tion period in case of acknowledgment or 
part payment is limited by 78-12-44 so that 
it now applies only to contract actions. 
Yergensen v. Ford, 16 U. (2d) 397, 402 
P. 2d 696. 
Mortgage foreclosure decree. 
Mortgage foreclosure decree could not 
be collaterally attacked for mortgagee's 
failure to serve proper representative of 
estate of deceased mortgagor, where de-
fendants in that action defaulted, no ap-
peal was taken and foreclosure decree had 
become final, and where foreclosure record 
did not show such error or defect on its 
face; this section afforded no defense to 
subsequent action to quiet title instituted 
by mortgagee who purchased at foreclosure 
sale. Zion's Ben. Bldg. Soc. v. Geary, 112 
U. 548, 189 P. 2d 964. 
Pleadings. 
Complaint based on judgment is timely 
under this section though filed one day 
after expiration of eight-year limitation 
period where previous day was Sunday, in 
view of former sections 88-2-7 and 88-2-8 
(Code 1943). Nelson v. Jorgenson, 66 U. 
360, 242 P. 945. 
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LIMITATION OF ACTIONS 78-12-35 
78-12-45. Action barred in another state barred here. 
78-12-46. "Action" includes special proceeding. 
78-12-47. Separate trial of statute of limitations issue in malpractice actions. 
78-12-35. Effect of absence from state.—If when a cause of action 
accrues against a person when he is out of the state, the action may be 
commenced within the term herein limited after his return to the state; 
and if after a cause of action accrues he departs from the state, the time 
of his absence is not part of the time limited for the commencement of 
the action. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, §1 ; C. 1943, 
Supp., 104-12-35. 
Compiler's Notes. 
This section is identical to former sec-
tion 104-2-36 (Code 1943) which was re-
pealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3. 
Application of section. 
The full time that the debtor is out of 
the state must be excluded in computing 
the time, notwithstanding fact that 
debtor's family may have residence or 
place of abode in state and that service of 
process could be made upon some member 
of debtor's family at its residence or 
place of abode. Keith-O'Brien Co. v. 
Snyder, 51 U. 227, 169 P. 954, applying 
former statute. 
Statute runs only during time debtor 
is openly in state, and immediately on 
his leaving it the statute again ceases to 
run until his return; in computing time 
all periods of absence must be considered 
and added together. Keith-O'Brien Co. v. 
Snyder, 51 U. 227, 169 P. 954, applying 
former statute. 
Maintenance of residence within state 
with persons living therein did not pre-
vent tolling of statute of limitations. 
Buell v. Duchesne Mercantile Co., 64 U. 
391, 231 P. 123, applying former statute. 
Construction of section. 
Although generally statutes of limita-
tion are to be liberally construed, it is 
also a well-recognized doctrine that when 
such statutes contain provisions except-
ing certain persons or classes from opera-
tion of statutes, those exceptions are to 
be strictly construed. Lawson v. Tripp, 
34 U. 28, 95 P. 520. 
Laches. 
Absence of defendant from state does 
not preclude interposition of defense of 
laches to suit for an accounting, even 
though statute of limitations has not 
barred proceeding. Smith v. Smith, 77 U. 
60, 291 P. 298. 
Proof of residence or nonresidence. 
A finding that defendant had his home, 
family and residence in state contin-
uously from time debt was contracted is 
sufficient finding of continuous presence 
in the state. Woolf v. Gray, 48 U. 239, 
158 P. 788. 
Plaintiff seeking to toll statute has bur-
den of proof; mere proof of nonresidence 
is not a prima facie showing of absence 
from state. Tracey v. Blood, 78 U. 385, 3 
P. 2d 263, applying identically worded 
Idaho statute. 
Tolling of statute as to foreign corpora-
tion. 
Where answer of defendant foreign cor-
poration set up statute of limitations as 
defense and face of pleadings and uncon-
tradicted evidence indicated statute had 
run, it was incumbent on plaintiff to state 
in his reply conditions tolling the statute; 
in Utah, foreign corporation's privilege of 
pleading statute of limitations was not 
conditioned on its compliance with "doing 
business within the state" statutes. Claw-
son v. Boston Acme Mines Dev. Co., 72 U. 
137, 269 P. 147, 59 A. L. R. 1318, applying 
former statutes. 
Words and phrases defined. 
The words "return" and "departs" in 
this section comprehend all persons who 
are without the state, and are not con-
fined to the inhabitants thereof. Burnes 
v. Crane, 1 U. 179, applying former statute. 
Word "return" as used in this section 
includes nonresidents as well as citizens 
of state who have gone abroad and re-
turned to state; the words "return to the 
state" are held to be equivalent to "come 
into the state." Lawson v. Tripp, 34 U. 
28, 95 P. 520, applying former statute. 
Collateral References. 
Limitation of Actions^=>84, 85. 
54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 211. 
51 Am. Jur. 2d 725 et seq., Limitation of 
Actions § 154 et seq. 
Absence of judgment debtor from state 





82 C.J.S. Statutes § 386. 
73 Am. Jur. 2d 505, Statutes § 384. 
Adoption of compiled or revised statutes 
as giving effect to former repealed or sus-
pended provisions contained therein, 12 A. 
L. R. 2d 423. 
Constitutionality and construction of re-
peal or modification by legislative action 
of teachers' tenure statute, as regards ret-
rospective operation, 147 A. L. R. 293. 
Constitutional requirement that repeal-
ing or amendatory statute refer to statute 
History: Code Report; R. S. 1933 & C. 
1943, 88-2-6. 
Re-enactment of statute. 
By re-enacting statutes Supreme Court 
must assume that legislature was satis-
fied with construction court placed upon 
statute before re-enactment. State v. Rob-
erts, 56 IT. 136, 190 P. 351. 
Re-enactment of statutes of limitation 
by R. S. 1933 amounted not to a repeal 
of the antecedent sections, but to a re-
affirmation thereof. Attorney General v. 
Pomeroy, 93 U. 426, 73 P. 2d 1277, 114 
A. L. R. 726. 
History: R. S. 1898 & C. L. 1907, § 2493; 
C. L. 1917, §5843; R. S. 1933 & C. 1943, 
88-2-7. 
Cross-References. 
Computation of time, Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, Rule 6(a). 
Enlargement of time for doing an act, 
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 6(b). 
Holidays, 63-13-2. 
Judicial notice as to measure of time, 
78-25-1. 
Juvenile Court Act, time to be computed 
in accordance with Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, 78-3a-27. 
Bills of exceptions. 
This section was applied in determining 
whether thirty-day period prescribed by 
former section 104-39-4, Code 1943, had ex-
pired before application was made for ex-
tension of time under former section 104-
42-7, Code 1943. Independent Gas & Oil 
repealed or amended, applicability to re-
peal or amendment by implication, 5 A. L 
R. 2d 1270. 
Retroactive application of repeal of 
statute which operated as limitation of or 
exception to a substantive right of action 
in tort otherwise arising at common law, 
120 A. L. R. 943. 
Simultaneous repeal and re-enactment of 
all, or part, of legislative act, 77 A. L. R. 
2d 336. 
Unconstitutionality of later statute as 
affecting provision purporting specifically 
to repeal earlier statute, 102 A. L. R. 802. 
Collateral References. 
Statutes<£=>147, 223.5. 
82 C.J.S. Statutes §§ 276, 370. 
73 Am. Jur. 2d 469, Statutes § 322. 
Presumption that, in re-enacting statute, 
legislature adopted previous judicial con-
struction thereof, as applied to construc-
tion by trial or intermediate appellate 
court, 146 A. L. R. 923. 
Simultaneous repeal and re-enactment of 
all, or part, of legislative act, 79 A. L. R. 
2d 336. 
Co. v. Beneficial Oil Co., 71 U. 348, 266 P. 
267. 
Computation of time in general 
Where statute requires or permits act to 
be done within stated number of days 
from or after a designated day, it is timely 
if done on the last day of the stated num-
ber; but where statute prescribes period 
within which act may not be done as not 
less than a certain number of days before 
designated day, act must be done without 
such period and cannot be performed on 
any day within such period, both desig-
nated day and most remote day within 
period being excluded as days on which 
act may be done. Wood v. Cowan, 68 TJ. 
388, 250 P. 979; Anderson v. Cook, 102 
U. 265, 130 P. 2d 278, 143 A. L. R. 987. 
Daylight saving time. 
The courts will take judicial notice of 
the fact that a certain system of time is 
68-3-6. Identical provisions deemed a continuation, not new enact-
ment.—The provisions of any statute, so far as they are the same as those 
of any prior statute, shall be construed as a continuation of such provisions, 
and not as a new enactment. 
68-3-7. Time, how computed.—The time in which any act provided 
by law is to be done is computed by excluding the first day and including 
the last, unless the last is a holiday, and then it also is excluded. 
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Rule 4(e) RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Where defendant "may be found." 
Where defendant was served in transi-
tory tor t action in county of residence, 
court acquired jurisdiction of action de-
spite fact that acts complained of occurred 
in different county. Sanipoli v. Pleasant 
Valley Coal Co., 31 U. 114, 86 P . 865, 10 
Ann. Cas. 1142, applying R. S. 1898, § 2940. 
Where obligors on bond were sued in 
county other than county of their resi-
dence and were personally served, court 
had jurisdiction over them; the court re-
jected contention that defendants not hav-
ing contracted to perform their obligation 
at any part icular place, the cause of ac-
tion must be deemed to have arisen where 
they reside. Continental Life Ins. & Inv. 
Co. v. Jones, 31 U. 403, 88 P . 229. 
(e) Personal Service in this State. Personal service within the state 
shall be as follows: 
(1) Upon a natural person of the age of 14 years or over, by delivering 
a copy thereof to him personally, or by leaving such copy at his usual 
place of abode with some person of suitable age and discretion there 
residing; or by delivering a copy to an agent authorized by appointment 
or by law to receive service of process. 
Secretary of state as agent. 
Nonresident motorists were not "absent 
from the s t a t e " so as to toll the statute 
of limitations although they left the state 
immediately after collision and remained 
without s ta te , because process could have 
been served upon secretary of state. 




72 C.J.S. Process §§ 26 to 42. 
62 Am. Jur . 2d 828, Process § 47. 
Armed forces: service of process on 
person in military service by serving per-
son at civilian abode or residence, or leav-
ing copy there, 46 A. L. R. 2d 1239. 
Construction of phrase "usual place of 
abode," or similar terms referring to 
abode, residence, or domicil, as used in 
statutes relating to service of process, 32 
A. L. R. 3d 112. 
Doing business: what amounts to doing 
business in a state within s ta tute provid-
ing for service of process in action against 
nonresident natural person or persons do-
ing business in state, 10 A. L. R. 2d 200. 
Fraud or trickery, a t tack on personal 
service as having been obtained by, 98 
A. L. R. 2d 551. 
Necessity, in service by leaving process 
at place of abode, etc., of leaving a copy 
of summons for each par ty sought to be 
served, 8 A. L. R. 2d 343. 
Place or manner of delivering or de-
positing papers, under s ta tutes permit t ing 
service of process by leaving copy at usual 
place of abode or residence, 87 A. L. R. 2d 
1163. 
(2) Upon a natural person under the age of 14 years, by delivering 
a copy thereof to such person and also to his father, mother or guardian; 
or, if none can be found within the state, then to any person having the 
Compiler's Notes. 
This section is modeled after Fed. Rule 
4 ( d ) ( 1 ) . 
Gross-References. 
Condominium ownership, service of proc-
ess on person designated in declaration, 
57-8-33. 
Failure to serve summons upon defend-
ant , motion for relief, Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, Rule 60(b) . 
Highways, service of process on non-
resident motorist using, 41-12-8. 
Insurance agent or broker, agent for 
service of process on nonresident, 31-17-35. 
News gathering, service of process on 
person in business of, 50-2-7. 
Nonresidents, acts submit t ing person to 
jurisdiction of s tate courts, 78-27-22 to 78-
27-24. 
Par t ies not originally served, proceed-
ings after judgment, Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, Rule 71B(b) . 
Prisoners, service of process on, 17-22-6. 
Real estate broker, agent for service of 
process on nonresident, 61-2-6. 
Real estate brokers and salesmen, no-
tice of hearing on license, 61-2-12. 
Sheriff, service of process on as party, 
17-22-25. 
Enticement into state. 
Par ty invited into state by plaintiff to 
discuss disputed matter was not subject 
to service of process for reasonable time 
covering negotiation period and his com-
ing to and returning from meeting. West-
ern States Refining Co. v. Berry, 6 U. (2d) 
336, 313 P . 2d 480. 
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